
Research Report

Managing the Goal-Setting Paradox: How To Get Better Results from High Goals and Be Happy

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Many negotiation teachers share the same tip early on: negotiators who set higher goals “do better.” It turns out that one of the most empirically supported “truths” about negotiation comes with a big “but.” Negotiators who set higher goals are likely to feel worse. In other words, negotiators who set optimistic goals are likely to obtain better objective outcomes but worse subjective outcomes.

We call this empirical finding the “goal-setting paradox.” This article considers sources of and explanations for the goal-setting paradox and suggests how negotiators and negotiation teachers may better manage this paradox through mindfulness and other techniques.

Key Words: negotiation, psychology, mindfulness, goals, outcomes.

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1 Introduction

2 Many negotiation teachers and trainers share the same tip early on: nego-
3 tiators who set higher goals “do better.” It turns out that one of the most
4 empirically supported truths about negotiation, however, comes with a big
5 “but” because negotiators who set higher goals are likely to *feel* worse. In
6 other words, negotiators who set optimistic goals are likely to obtain better
7 *objective* outcomes but worse *subjective* outcomes.

8 We call this empirical finding the “goal-setting paradox.” Others might
9 describe it as a tension between goal setting and happiness along the lines
10 of other familiar tensions like those between assertiveness and empathy or
11 creating and claiming value (Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello 2000). Much
12 as we might want to treat this goal-setting paradox or tension as an anomaly,
13 we know it comports with other research demonstrating that conventional
14 measures of success may also be associated with unhappiness. In one study,
15 for example, law students with pessimistic explanatory styles got better
16 grades (i.e., objective outcomes) but were more susceptible to depression
17 (i.e., subjective outcomes) (Satterfield, Monahan, and Seligman 1998).¹

18 The goal-setting paradox calls us to question the negotiation litera-
19 ture’s standard advice to set high goals. Because research shows negotiators
20 want both good results (objective success) and to feel good (subjective
21 success) (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu 2006), what should they do? Should
22 they aim high, getting good results but feeling worse, or should they aim
23 lower, getting worse results but feeling better? Or, to use another familiar
24 framework, should negotiators seek to maximize, or should they be content
25 to satisfice (Simon 1956)? In other words, do we try to get the very best
26 result, or just an acceptable one?

27 The problem with both of these approaches is that they leave
28 negotiators vulnerable, either to unhappiness (in the case of maximizing)
29 or underperformance (in the case of satisficing). We recommend a third
30 approach, which we call the “maximize-and-expand” approach. We argue
31 that negotiators should set ambitious goals, but that they should also culti-
32 vate a wider mindset that enables them to expand their awareness, focus,
33 and acceptance. That is, negotiators should set their sights high in negotia-
34 tion, but they should adopt strategies — some of which we identify below
35 — to preserve and enhance their sense of well-being, regardless of out-
36 comes. We also identify three concrete steps that negotiation teachers and
37 trainers can take to help their students embrace the maximize-and-expand
38 approach to goal setting that we recommend.

39 “Better” Outcomes

40 Nearly every negotiation scholar and teacher advises negotiators to aim
41 high. Charles Craver argues, for example, that those “who want better deals
42 get better deals,” so “set your goals high” (Craver 2002: 36). Likewise, Richard
43

1 Shell recommends that “[w]hen you set goals, think boldly and optimisti-
2 cally about what you would like to see happen” (Shell 2006: 34). Leigh
3 Thompson also advises that “it is important to optimize one’s strategies by
4 setting high aspirations and attempting to achieve as much as possible . . .”
5 (Thompson 2005: 7). In sum, negotiation theorists “*uniformly* argue that
6 high aspirations are desirable . . .” (Korobkin 2002: 56, emphasis added).
7 This advice deserves special attention because it is based on solid and
8 consistent empirical research. In several studies, researchers have found
9 that negotiators with more ambitious goals outperform negotiators with
10 more modest goals. In one classic study, for example, Sidney Siegel and
11 Lawrence Fouraker recruited subjects to participate in a buy–sell negotia-
12 tion. They gave some subjects an ambitious goal of a \$6.10 profit and other
13 subjects a modest goal of a \$2.10 profit. The former subjects obtained, on
14 average, a \$6.25 profit, while the latter subjects obtained, on average, a
15 much smaller \$3.35 profit (Siegel and Fouraker 1960). More recently, in a
16 study of actual salary negotiations undertaken by MBA graduates, Hannah
17 Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock, and Kathleen McGinn found that “a 30
18 percent increase in a person’s goal going into a negotiation produced, at a
19 minimum, a 10 percent increase in the negotiated amount he or she was
20 able to obtain” (Babcock and Laschever 2003: 132).

21 Higher goals are associated with better outcomes not only in distribu-
22 tive negotiations, but even in negotiations with “win-win” or integrative
23 potential. Unlike distributive negotiations, where one side can win only at
24 the expense of the other, integrative negotiations involve potential for both
25 sides to create value through creative solutions or logrolling (i.e., letting
26 each side win on issues that are more important to that side and less
27 important to the other) (Thompson 1990). In one recent study, for example,
28 Adam Galinsky and his colleagues found that negotiators primed to focus
29 on their aspirations were more likely than those primed to focus on their
30 constraints to maximize their joint gains in an integrative negotiation
31 (Galinsky et al. 2005).

32 Finally, a broader literature suggests that those who set higher goals do
33 better not just at negotiation but when performing many other tasks as
34 well. As Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever put it:

35
36 Extensive research on the relationship between goal-setting and
37 performance — for example, among dieters and recovering
38 addicts — has found that setting concrete, challenging goals con-
39 sistent improves results. Research confirms that this is true for
40 negotiating as well: people who go into negotiations with more
41 ambitious targets tend to get more of what they want than people
42 who go in with more moderate goals (Babcock and Laschever
43 2003: 132).

44
45 But at what cost?

1 “Worse” Outcomes

2 Negotiators who set their sights high are likely to obtain better results, but
3 research shows that they are also likely to feel worse about those results.
4 Suppose, for example, that Negotiator A and Negotiator B are co-employees,
5 each making \$50,000 a year. Going into salary negotiations with their
6 manager, suppose that Negotiator A has a goal of a 10-percent raise, and
7 Negotiator B seeks a 5-percent raise. Consistent with the research reported
8 above, assume that Negotiator A obtains a 7-percent raise (i.e., \$3,500), and
9 Negotiator B obtains a 6-percent raise (i.e., \$3,000). Negotiator A is now
10 \$500 wealthier, but she is likely to feel significantly worse about the nego-
11 tiation than Negotiator B. Why? The basic intuition is straightforward. As
12 Russell Korobkin explains it, the higher a negotiator’s aspiration, “the less
13 likely she will be to achieve the aspiration, often resulting in less satisfaction
14 for the [negotiator], even holding outcomes constant” (Korobkin 2002: 59).

15 This intuition is supported by empirical research. As Jared Curhan and
16 his colleagues observe, “experimental manipulations such as increasing
17 or attending to one’s aspirations can drive the two in opposite directions,
18 increasing objective negotiation performance while simultaneously reduc-
19 ing subjective satisfaction” (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu 2006: 495). In one
20 compelling demonstration, Galinsky and his colleagues asked subjects to
21 negotiate the prospective purchase of a pharmaceutical plant. The research-
22 ers instructed some of the participants playing the role of buyers to focus on
23 their aspirations and others to focus on their best alternative to a negotiated
24 agreement (BATNA). Subjects in the former group obtained significantly
25 better outcomes — that is, they purchased the plant for nearly two million
26 dollars less than the subjects in the latter group — but felt significantly
27 worse about the negotiation (Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec 2002: 1135).

28 In a similar real-world study, Sheena Iyengar and her colleagues studied
29 the job-seeking and negotiation behavior of graduating students from
30 eleven different universities. Based on subjects’ responses to several items
31 drawn from a maximization scale (Schwartz et al. 2002), the researchers
32 categorized the subjects as either maximizers or satisficers. They found
33 that the maximizers negotiated average starting salaries that were nearly
34 20 percent higher than those obtained by the satisficers; despite this,
35 the maximizers were significantly “less satisfied with the outcomes of their
36 job search, and more pessimistic, stressed, tired, anxious, worried,
37 overwhelmed, and depressed throughout the process” (Iyengar, Wells, and
38 Schwartz 2006: 147).

39 These findings — documented by other researchers in other studies
40 (Oliver, Balakrishnan, and Barry 1994; Thompson 1995) — illustrate the
41 goal-setting paradox. Negotiators who heed the prescriptive negotiation
42 literature’s advice to set ambitious goals are likely to do well but feel
43 unsatisfied:

1 Although a target-focused negotiator may, over time, obtain prof-
2 itable outcomes and an ever-increasing state of objective wealth,
3 that negotiator may not be able to appreciate the rewards gained.
4 This state of dissatisfaction despite increases in overall wealth
5 is not unlike the hedonic treadmill, in which adaptation to
6 improving circumstance prevents individuals from appreciating
7 advances in objective wealth (Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec
8 20021: 138).

9
10 We can expect the goal-setting paradox to extend to integrative nego-
11 tiations, as well. Such negotiations often involve more options and greater
12 choice, and research shows that maximizers faced with more options
13 experience “choice overload” and thereby less satisfaction (Guthrie 2003;
14 Schwartz 2004).

15 The paradox extends even beyond negotiation. As noted, those who
16 set high goals tend to do better at a variety of tasks, such as dieting and
17 overcoming unhealthy addictions. Research also shows, however, that such
18 maximizers tend to report lower levels of happiness (Schwartz 2004).

19 We recognize that the research literature might overstate the goal-
20 setting paradox. In particular, we acknowledge that the negative feelings
21 that higher goal setters report might be transitory. The so-called “psycho-
22 logical immune system” might kick in to bring individuals back to their
23 relatively stable “set point,” or typical range, of subjective satisfaction
24 (Wilson and Gilbert 2005). Alternatively, even if one rejects the substantial
25 evidence for the existence of set points of satisfaction, one might be
26 skeptical of the goal-setting paradox for an entirely different reason. Some
27 might say simulated negotiations fail to capture the dynamics of actual
28 negotiations. Imagine, for instance, that a negotiator saved two million
29 dollars not in a *simulated* negotiation, as reported above, but in an *actual*
30 negotiation. Two million dollars would seem to buy lots of therapy, whether
31 in the form of psychotherapy, psychopharmacology, or good old-fashioned
32 retail! So, too, even those people who report more stress after negotiating
33 higher salaries may discover greater rewards in the years to come. After all,
34 raises build on prior salaries, and the stream of future income may be more
35 than individuals realize in what might be momentary disappointment
36 (Babcock and Laschever 2003). The substantial research literature showing
37 that wealth above a modest level does not enhance happiness, however,
38 undercuts this critique somewhat (Seligman 2002).

39 Far from overestimating the goal-setting paradox, then, the existing
40 research may actually underestimate it. Existing studies focus on short-term
41 evaluations, showing that negotiators who set higher goals report less
42 satisfaction immediately after a negotiation. We know of no studies that
43 look at the long-term consequences of setting (and failing to achieve)
44 higher goals in negotiation, but we hypothesize at least three ways in which
45 such a mindset might hurt.

1 First, individuals who change their negotiation behavior might shift
2 their behavior and orientation more generally. In particular, individuals
3 taught to set higher goals in negotiation may find themselves setting higher
4 goals in other areas of life: perhaps they want to run faster on the track, lose
5 even more weight, get “their” children into even “better” schools. In short,
6 those who seemed more like satisficers may start to seem more like maxi-
7 mizers. And, as we saw, research shows that maximizers tend to do better at
8 most tasks — but feel worse (Schwartz 2004).

9 Second, individuals trying to obtain optimal objective outcomes for
10 themselves may find that they are tempted to violate their own ethical
11 limits. People who once disclosed information freely may find themselves
12 withholding information, engaging in “puffery,” or even making false state-
13 ments of fact. All of us who teach negotiation see how some students feel
14 pulled in this direction. This change in behavior may create a painful gap
15 between how individuals feel they should act, and how they feel compelled
16 to act. For some, this may create a crisis of identity.

17 Third, even those whose behavior or traits or personalities remain the
18 same after being taught to elevate their goals may find themselves affected
19 by others who learned those lessons in different ways. Teaching classes of
20 students to set higher goals increases the odds that any given person will
21 now find herself enmeshed in longer and less pleasant negotiations. This
22 may exact a kind of emotional tax on those who would prefer not to
23 negotiate or not to negotiate in such a way.

24 All in all, the research on the goal-setting paradox is compelling and
25 may even fail to capture the full extent of the tension between setting high
26 goals on the one hand and achieving happiness on the other. This obser-
27 vation provokes two related questions. First, what should negotiators do to
28 address this tension? Second, how can negotiation teachers and trainers
29 help their students in this process?

30 **The Maximize-and-Expand Approach**

31 Some negotiation teachers acknowledge the goal-setting paradox but are
32 unconcerned about it. For them, negotiators should seek to maximize
33 objective outcomes, which they might see as tangible and durable, rather
34 than subjective well-being, which they might see as intangible and ephem-
35 eral. For example, Craver reports with understandable frustration that his
36 negotiation students who set modest goals “are more pleased with their
37 results than are more adroit colleagues who establish higher objectives but
38 fall slightly short of their targets” (Craver 2002: 37). Consistent with the
39 conventional wisdom among negotiation theorists, he recommends setting
40 ever higher goals:

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43 If you always or almost always get what you initially hope to
44 achieve when you enter bargaining interactions, you should begin

1 to raise your aspiration levels, initially by 10 to 15 percent. . . . If
2 you continue to get everything you seek, raise your objectives
3 again in 10 to 15 percent increments until you begin to occasion-
4 ally fall short of your targets. At this point, you can be confident
5 that you have learned to establish appropriately elevated aspira-
6 tion levels (Craver 2002: 37).

7
8 Others take the opposite position. The psychologist Barry Schwartz, who
9 focuses his analysis not on negotiation, but more broadly on choice, goes
10 much further. Like other theorists, he concedes that “maximizers might do
11 better *objectively* than satisficers,” but he argues that “[g]etting the best
12 objective result may not be worth much if we feel disappointed with it
13 anyway” (Schwartz 2004: 88–89). Thus, he advocates modest aspirations:

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15 The lesson here is that high expectations can be counterproduc-
16 tive. We probably can do more to affect the quality of our lives by
17 controlling our expectations than we can by doing virtually any-
18 thing else. The blessing of modest expectations is that they leave
19 room for many experiences to be a pleasant surprise, a hedonic
20 plus (Schwartz 2004: 187).

21
22 Korobkin proposes a more prudent approach to the paradox. He begins by
23 questioning “the usual prescriptive advice that negotiators should always
24 set high aspirations” (Korobkin 2002: 61). He recognizes that high aspira-
25 tions offer benefits (better objective outcomes) and that they impose costs
26 (inferior subjective outcomes and a higher risk of bargaining impasse). He
27 thus recommends that negotiators balance the anticipated benefits against
28 the anticipated costs before setting high goals:

29
30 In determining whether high aspirations are desirable on balance
31 in a particular bargaining context, negotiators must carefully
32 weigh these two costs against the notable benefits. This conclu-
33 sion suggests that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there
34 is no context-independent answer to the question of whether
35 high aspirations will benefit a litigant more than would low
36 aspirations (Korobkin 2002: 56).

37
38 Given the overwhelming evidence that ambitious goals lead to better objec-
39 tive outcomes, we believe, along with Craver and other negotiation teachers,
40 that negotiators should aim high.² That said, we also value subjective
41 happiness, and we share Schwartz’s insight that “the best objective result
42 may not be worth much if we feel disappointed with it anyway” (Schwartz
43 2004: 88–89). More broadly, we admire the proponents of both therapeutic
44 jurisprudence and hedonic psychology who argue that policies and prac-
45 tices should be evaluated, at least in part, based on their impact on our
46 subjective well-being (Stolle, Wexler, and Winick 2000). Thus, Korobkin’s
47 more measured advice to negotiators to think carefully about the benefits

1 and costs of lofty aspirations makes sense to us. Building on this balanced
2 approach, we advise negotiators to address the goal-setting paradox by
3 adopting what we call the maximize-and-expand approach. That is, negotia-
4 tors should seek to maximize their objective outcomes in negotiation, but
5 they should also seek to expand their self-awareness, focus, and self-
6 acceptance.

7 ***Expanding Self-Awareness***

8 Negotiators should focus on the nature of their emotional reactions during
9 and after a negotiation. At a minimum, this includes asking themselves the
10 same kinds of questions that researchers asked participants in their studies.
11 When they set higher goals, how do they feel after a negotiation? How
12 intense is that feeling? What thoughts arise? (Do they think “Wow, I really
13 can accomplish things” or “Darn, I wonder if I left money on the table — I
14 wonder if I’m just that kind of person?”)

15
16 Negotiators might also enhance their self-awareness through the prac-
17 tice of mindfulness. Although definitions vary, we use the term here to
18 mean developing an awareness of what is happening in a particular
19 moment and accepting this information in a relatively nonjudgmental way
20 (Freshman, Hayes, and Feldman 2002). Mindfulness may be applied to
21 attitudes (“a maximizing mindset seems to be dominating me now”) or
22 emotions (“some vague dissatisfaction seems to be arising now”). Some
23 people find that they can learn to recognize their emotions by noticing
24 their physical sensations. Mindfulness practice can also include developing
25 awareness of the thoughts and emotions of others. Decades of research by
26 Paul Ekman shows that particular emotions, such as anger and sadness, may
27 show up in predictable physical patterns even among different people in
28 different cultures (Ekman 2004; Freshman 2006).

29 Many mindfulness teachers suggest that becoming mindful of emo-
30 tional states may make those emotions pass more quickly. Some also suggest
31 that if such an emotion as disappointment because one has failed to meet
32 a high goal were to linger, a negotiator can learn to recognize this as
33 normal. “Oh, I’m just suffering from the winner’s curse,” they might say to
34 themselves. “Many times, people who do well wonder if they could have
35 done better. There’s nothing wrong with me.”

36 Mindfulness can do double duty. At the simplest level, it provides
37 feedback about what may work for a given individual. At the same time, its
38 practice may lead not only to further negotiating success, but also to greater
39 emotional and, according to some research, physical health as well
40 (Freshman, Hayes, and Feldman 2002; Brach 2008).

41 ***Expanding Focus***

42 In reflecting upon a negotiation, a negotiator should focus broadly. It is easy
43 to focus narrowly on one outcome, such as price, and to compare it to a
44 high, unmet goal. Instead, we recommend that she expand her focus to a
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1 variety of experiences before, during, and after the negotiation. Ironically,
2 this expanded focus may not only make her feel better, but possibly enable
3 her to do better. Both philosophers and spiritual teachers recognize this
4 kind of paradox. Philosophers note the paradox of hedonism, that those
5 who focus most on pleasure may have less enjoyment than those who
6 simply get lost in projects they find meaningful (Smart and Williams
7 1973). Psychologists of happiness provide some support for this claim ³
8 (Csíkszentmihályi 1996; Seligman 2002). Spiritual teachers of meditation
9 often note that those who strive too directly for relaxation or heightened
10 peak experience may ironically have less success than those who commit
11 to more modest goals, such as simply accepting whatever is arising with
12 nonjudgmental acceptance (Catherine 2008). Some negotiation theorists
13 would see this technique as essential to understanding the full range of the
14 parties' broader interests as well as their narrower positions.

15 For example, a negotiator might expand her focus to consider other
16 types of successes she has enjoyed in the negotiation, including meeting
17 goals about *how* she conducted the negotiation (process goals). Among
18 other things, a negotiator might notice how well she stuck to her own
19 ethical standards (whether that means not making false statements,
20 guarding against harmful disclosures, or any other standard she may find
21 personally meaningful) or how much effort she expended to try to expand
22 the pie to create win-win solutions.

23 Recent research suggests this kind of self-management benefits women
24 in particular. When groups of students are told merely to set higher goals,
25 both men and women do better, but men still do better than women. When
26 classes are instead taught self-management skills, women make larger
27 improvements than men (Babcock and Laschever 2003). Likewise, a nego-
28 tiator might expand her focus by comparing the outcome she obtained
29 relative to her list of feasible alternatives or to her BATNA. She might have
30 fallen short of her aspiration, but she will have exceeded her bottom line or
31 BATNA because she should only have entered into an agreement if the
32 agreement exceeded these measures. This comparison should lead to feel-
33 ings of satisfaction and accomplishment rather than dissatisfaction and
34 failure.

35 *Expanding Self-Acceptance*

36 Negotiators might also attempt to cultivate "self-acceptance" (Ellis 1962).
37 Self-acceptance or "unconditional self-acceptance," as used by the psycho-
38 therapist and scholar Albert Ellis, means that "the individual fully and
39 unconditionally accepts himself whether or not he behaves intelligently,
40 correctly, or competently and whether or not other people approve,
41 respect, or love him" (Ellis 1977: 101). Researchers have found that those
42 who score highly on self-acceptance tend to be "lower in depression and
43 anxiety and higher in happiness or general well-being" (Chamberlain and
44

1 Haaga 2001a: 171) and to respond more favorably to negative feedback
2 (Chamberlain and Haaga 2001b: 187). By combining high aspirations with
3 self-acceptance, negotiators might attain a kind of “positive perfectionism,”
4 that is, “a striving for perfection” coupled with “the acceptance of non-
5 perfection” (Lundh 2004: 266).

6 Several different kinds of techniques may foster such acceptance.
7 Cognitive therapy for obsessive behaviors, including perfectionism, may be
8 instructive (Beck 1995; Lundh 2004). Such cognitive therapists often ask
9 clients with an obsession on, for example, cleanliness, “Does it have to be
10 100 percent clean? What if it were 90 percent clean?” Clients often say 90
11 percent would be acceptable, and then therapists continue a similar dia-
12 logue to get clients to recognize that something less than perfection may be
13 tolerable. Some economists, too, counsel that people evaluate investments
14 and choices not by success *ex post* but by the *ex ante* process by which
15 they made the decision (Hay 1997). More spiritual approaches sometimes
16 teach people to disidentify with some concepts, such as material outcomes,
17 and focus instead on other qualities, such as ethical behavior (Goldstein
18 1993). Despite their rather different origins and language, each of these
19 three techniques help individuals refocus from outcomes partly beyond
20 their control — such as how negotiation counterparts behave — to poten-
21 tially less volatile processes within an individual’s control.

22 **Teaching the Maximize-and-Expand Approach**

23 Negotiation teachers and trainers who aspire to help their students obtain
24 the best possible objective *and* subjective outcomes can help them learn
25 how to embrace the maximize-and-expand approach to goal setting. We
26 recommend, in particular, that negotiation teachers and trainers consider
27 implementing one or more of the following three options: structured
28 debriefing, targeted journaling exercises, and mindfulness instruction.

29 ***Structured Debriefing***

30 Following the completion of a negotiation simulation, negotiation teachers
31 and trainers typically “debrief” the simulation in class. Commonly, as part
32 of the debriefing process, negotiation teachers ask the students to share such
33 information as their BATNAs, goals, and outcomes. Feedback from multiple
34 pairs negotiating the same problem is unavailable in the real world, so this
35 information can be quite illuminating; but it can also lead those who
36 obtained good objective outcomes relative to their goals to become com-
37 placent and those who obtained bad objective outcomes relative to their
38 goals to feel dissatisfied or inadequate.

39 To encourage a maximize-and-expand mindset among students, we
40 recommend that negotiation teachers and trainers occasionally focus the
41 debriefing session solely on the negotiation process itself. To do so, they can
42 begin by instructing their students not to share any information about their
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1 BATNAs, goals, or outcomes. Then, they can ask questions focused solely on
2 the process. For example, they could ask: how did you elicit information
3 from your counterpart? How did he elicit it from you? Did your counterpart
4 listen to you? Did that prompt you to share more information? Did you
5 attempt to expand the pie? What options did you consider? How did you
6 get those on the table? What standards were relevant to determining how
7 to resolve your dispute or to close your deal? How did you decide which
8 one or ones should govern? By conducting a debriefing session in which
9 outcomes are ignored, negotiation teachers can, implicitly or explicitly,
10 encourage students to broaden their focus to the way they conducted the
11 negotiation process itself.

12 *Targeted Journaling Exercises*

13 Many negotiation teachers and trainers instruct their students to write
14 journal entries about their negotiation experiences, and teachers can
15 use this process to encourage a maximize-and-expand mindset in their
16 students. We recommend two journal exercises in particular. First, follow-
17 ing a simulated negotiation, we recommend that negotiation teachers
18 direct their students to write a journal entry in which they focus their
19 evaluation solely on the way they conducted the negotiation process. By
20 shifting student focus from outcome to process, negotiation teachers may
21 distract their students from comparing outcomes in favor of encouraging
22 students to focus on their listening, information gathering, and option-
23 generating skills.

24
25 Second, we recommend that negotiation teachers direct their students
26 to write a journal entry following a simulated negotiation in which they are
27 directed to evaluate their outcome solely in light of their BATNA. Experi-
28 mental evidence actually supports this strategy. As mentioned above, Galin-
29 sky and his colleagues asked subjects to negotiate the prospective purchase
30 of a pharmaceutical plant. In one version, the researchers instructed some
31 of the “sellers” to focus on their aspirations and others to focus on their
32 BATNA. Consistent with other research illustrating the goal-setting paradox,
33 Galinsky and his colleagues found that the sellers in the aspiration group
34 obtained significantly better outcomes — that is, they sold the plant for
35 nearly \$1.5 million more than the subjects in the BATNA group — but felt
36 significantly worse about the negotiation (Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec
37 2002: 1135).

38 This time, though, the researchers provided a potential way out of the
39 paradox. Following the negotiation, and before they asked about satisfac-
40 tion, they prompted some of the subjects to focus on their BATNA by asking
41 them to indicate what it was. They found that sellers who focused on their
42 BATNA before contemplating their satisfaction with the outcome were
43 equally satisfied with the outcome, whether they were initially instructed to
44 focus on their aspiration or their BATNA (Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec

2002). As they explain it, “[f]ocusing on their target price before and during the course of a negotiation and then focusing on their lower bound after the negotiation allowed negotiators to have their cake and eat it, too: objectively superior outcomes topped with an icing of satisfaction” (Galinsky, Mussweiler and Medvec 2002: 1138).

Mindfulness Instruction

Mindfulness practice, as noted above, can facilitate greater emotional awareness of oneself and others, among other things. Even one hour of external mindfulness training to help recognize emotions in the faces of others often leads to significant improvement in the recognition of emotions expressed in the faces of others (Ekman 2004). And training in internal mindfulness is now readily available and offered in many dispute-resolution settings (Riskin 2004).

Teachers and trainers can also encourage their students to embrace a maximize-and-expand mindset by leading them in guided mindfulness exercises. Mindfulness training of any kind at any time may increase the flexibility of students to shift from automatic, competitive thoughts to more flexible mindsets. In addition, teachers may craft mindfulness moments for particular points in negotiation teaching as well. In particular, teachers may remind students to become mindful of the kind of attitude they are taking at any given moment. During negotiations themselves, teachers may signal participants to become more mindful. Some may explain before the negotiation that they will literally ring a bell to signal participants to stop speaking, be still, and observe a few seconds (or more) of mindfulness before proceeding. Others may simply say something like, “Everyone stop. Stay still. What is your attitude now? Are you stuck in perfectionism? Are you open to broader perspectives?” So, too, when negotiations end, teachers may ring a mindfulness bell and ask similar questions. They might also ask, “Are you remembering how far you’ve come so far?” Those who teach their students external mindfulness may also ask students during negotiations, “What do you see in the faces of your counterparts? How can you help broaden their perspective?” A bit later they may ring the bell and ask again, “What do you see in the faces of your counterparts now? If you’ve tried to shift their frame, has it worked? What might you try now?”

Conclusion

A famous mindfulness meditation teacher once said that the problem with Westerners is not that they aim high, but at the wrong things: fleeting sense pleasures rather than full enlightenment. So, too, we as negotiators may aim “high” on things like selling price, but lose track of other, deeper goals, including the well-being of all those affected.³ But don’t just believe us. In your next negotiation, set your goals high, but be aware,

1 broadly focused, and accepting. In other words, do not lose sight of your
2 narrow, short-term goals, but as you attempt to meet them, broaden your
3 focus, attend to your emotional reactions, and be self-accepting and for-
4 giving. Likewise, teachers may share these same attitudes with their stu-
5 dents, helping them through structured debriefing processes, journaling
6 assignments, and mindfulness exercises to expand their awareness.

7 The net effect, for both negotiators and those who teach them, is that
8 you and your students might get a better price along with a better night's
9 sleep! So, too, even those who negotiate for others will benefit their clients,
10 and agents will benefit their principals. Decades of research shows happier
11 negotiators reach better results (Freshman, Hayes and Feldman 2002; Fresh-
12 man, Hayes and Feldman 2008). This includes better results in terms of
13 meeting individual goals and in approaching more efficient, joint gains
14 (Freshman, Hayes and Feldman 2002; Freshman, Hayes and Feldman 2008).
15 In short, teachers who help negotiators expand focus can make their
16 students, their clients, and society wealthier as well as happier. And what
17 teacher wouldn't smile at that prospect?

18 NOTES

19 We are grateful for helpful comments from Chris Knowlton, Grande Lum, Melissa Nelken, Lee
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22 manuscript.

23 1. To be complete, research by one of us (Freshman) found that another kind of optimism was
24 actually associated both with higher grades, better mental health, and better negotiation success
25 (Freshman, Hayes, and Feldman 2008).

26 2. This is particularly so for some negotiators. Those who represent clients to whom they owe
27 fiduciary obligations — for example, a lawyer-negotiator — could be tempted otherwise to maxi-
28 mize their happiness by setting lower goals for their clients so that they themselves do not pay the
29 psychic cost of maximizing success. Higher goals may also serve many women and others who are
30 members of groups that have systematically underperformed apparently due to modest goal setting
31 (Babcock and Laschever 2003).

32 3. We say “including” mindfully, following the insights of Bruce Winick, that therapeutic
33 jurisprudence includes therapeutic values as one of many potential values, including more familiar
34 economic goals (Stolle, Wexler and Winick 2000).

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